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REBOOTING CALIFORNIA—
INITIATIVES, CONVENTIONS AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM:
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Karl Manheim,* John S. Caragozian,** and
Donald Warner***
All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for the protection, security and benefit
of the people; and they have the right to alter or reform the same,
whenever the public good may require it.
—California Constitution of 1849, Article I, section 21
I. INTRODUCTION†
California is in trouble. Everyone knows it, but no one, it seems,
is able to do anything about it. State government is failing its citizens
in education, health care, infrastructure, parks, and elsewhere. Our
chronic budget deficits are causing havoc in the delivery of public
services and are depressing economic growth.2 City, county, and
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
*** Adjunct Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. The authors are grateful to
Natalie Pifer for her invaluable research and editorial help.
1. The Constitution of 1879 repeated the same text, absent the last comma, and it has
remained essentially the same since. This founding principle is now stated in the California
Constitution, Article II, section 1: ―All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it
when the public good may require.‖
† This Introduction and the articles in this Symposium issue were written for the campus
symposium held on September 24, 2010. That was five weeks prior to the general election, at
which some of the constitutional changes discussed in the articles were voted on. Where relevant,
we have noted the results of the November 2, 2010, election.
2. The Legislative Analyst‘s Office forecasts a General Fund deficit in excess of $20 billion
for 2010–2011 and similar amounts for the foreseeable future. ―[T]he scale of the deficits is so
vast that we know of no way that the Legislature, the Governor, and voters can avoid making
additional, very difficult choices about state priorities.‖ The 2010–11 Budget: California’s Fiscal
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school district budgets are repeatedly being raided, resulting in
trickle-down misery.3 We know the Golden State4 has lost its luster
when our license plates no longer carry that accolade but instead
carry logos to ―help our kids‖ and fund our firefighters, parks,
environment, arts, universities, and a variety of other public services
that once were among the nation‘s best.5 At least it is better than a
bake sale.
Not all of the state‘s woes are of its own making. Some are due
to the ongoing economic distress plaguing the nation and much of
the developed world. California‘s problems go far deeper and reach
further back than the current recession. The more enduring problems
are structural and affect the way we govern ourselves. Thus, while
the people of California have retained the right to reform their
government ―whenever the public good may require it,‖ we have
often had a hard time exercising that right in a constructive way.
Proposed solutions to California‘s troubles are not in short
supply, but ones that might actually work have been elusive. It seems
that nearly every interest group—as well as many civic and
governmental leaders—has a ―fix‖ in mind. Many of these solutions
wind up on the ballot, which results in a bewildering array of
complex legislative and constitutional amendments being put before
the voters on a regular basis. But, as it turns out, 38 million
Californians,6 composing one of the most diverse populations in the
world,7 struggle to competently exercise our inherent political power.
The consequence is a ―string of improvisations and hasty reforms

Outlook, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST‘S OFFICE, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/
bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_111809.aspx.
3. The 2010–11 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook, supra note 2 (―[W]e estimate [school
funding] will decline in 2010–11 and again in 2011–12. Thus, if the state funds schools at the
levels reflected in our forecast, school districts could face significant difficulties due to the
simultaneous decreases in federal and state/local funding.‖).
4. ―The Golden State‖ was made the official state nickname in 1968. History and Culture—
State Symbols, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, http://www.library.ca.gov/history/symbols.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2010).
5. See California Special Interest License Plates, CAL. DEP‘T OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/online/elp/elp.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
6. California 2010 Census, CAL. COMPLETE COUNT, http://www.californiacompletecount.
org/2010_census_explained/california_2010_census (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
7. California, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California (last visited Oct. 11,
2010).
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that ha[ve] given California a governing system both unintended and
unworkable.‖8
The problems confronting California today are not nearly as dire
as those that faced the nation at its inception. Still, as former state
historian Kevin Starr has warned, we may be on the verge of
becoming the ―first failed state in America.‖9 Accordingly, the
challenge posed to the people of New York by Alexander Hamilton
in Federalist Paper Number One is apropos:
[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, . . . to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether
they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force. . . . [T]he crisis at
which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the
era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve
to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.10
In the same spirit, but with less urgency, California‘s own
government structure needs repair. To that end, this Symposium
issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review brings together
notable scholars, political leaders, and policy advocates to address
the overriding problems facing California today. As we shall see in
the pages that follow, none of these groups have reached a consensus
on these issues, either among the polity or the leaders and scholars of
the state. But the purpose of this Symposium is more modest. This
Symposium aims to contribute to the dialogue and perhaps inform it
in positive ways. This will, we hope, provide material for thought
and for action, a springboard both for further academic endeavor and
for practical political and administrative steps toward reform. One

8. JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE
GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 2–3 (2010).
9. Thad Kousser, Essay: The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 569, 571 (2011) (quoting Kevin Starr in Paul Harris, Will California Become America’s
First Failed State?, OBSERVER (London), Oct. 4, 2009, at 32, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2009/oct/04/california-failing-state-debt).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (A.B.A. ed., 2009).
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thing is certain: California‘s luster is fading. We need a new
approach.
The following articles, essays, and commentaries were presented
at a live Symposium at Loyola Law School Los Angeles on
September 24, 2010, a few weeks before the general election.11
Earlier in the year, it appeared that the November ballot would
include a proposal to call a constitutional convention.12 The proposal
ultimately did not make the ballot, but its proponents managed to
launch several serious, albeit less ambitious in scope, efforts to bring
about structural change. This Symposium issue covers those efforts,
which consisted mostly of budgetary and political reforms.
The Symposium consisted of four panels, listed here along with
the panelists. Contributors to this issue are indicated by asterisks and
their pieces are briefly described later in this Introduction.
 Fiscal and Budgetary Problems/Reforms: Jon Coupal,13
John Heilman,14 Robert Hertzberg,15 and Sheila Kuehl.16
Dan Walters17 moderated this panel.
 Electoral and Structural Reforms: Jessica Levinson,*18
Justin Levitt,*19 Bruce McPherson,20 and Allan Ides.*21
Sherry Bebitch Jeffe22 moderated this panel.
11. Not all of the oral presentations were accompanied by written submissions for the Law
Review, but the Symposium website provides further information about all of the presenters.
Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Rebooting California: Initiatives, Conventions & Government Reform,
REBOOTCA.ORG, http://rebootca.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
12. See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text, and infra Part III.A.3.a; see also Steven
Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers)
Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional
Convention, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 547–48 (2011).
13. President, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, whose talk was titled Tax and Budget
Limitations.
14. Mayor, West Hollywood, California, and Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, whose
talk was titled Budgetary Impacts on California’s Cities.
15. Former Speaker, California State Assembly and Co-Chair, California Forward, whose
talk was titled Bipartisan Fiscal Reforms.
16. Former Member, California State Senate, whose talk was titled Tax and Budget Issues.
17. Senior Political Writer and Columnist, The Sacramento Bee.
18. Director of Political Reform, Center for Governmental Studies, whose talk was titled The
Constitutionality of Open Primaries.
19. Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, whose talk was titled The
Potential of Citizen Redistricting.
20. Former California Secretary of State and Leadership Council, California Forward, whose
talk was titled Get Real, and Reform.
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 Mechanisms for Constitutional Reform: Hon. Joseph
Grodin,*23 Thad Kousser,*24 Ann Lousin,*25 Steven
Miller,*26 and Raphael Sonenshein.*27 Karen Grigsby
Bates28 moderated this panel.
 The Future of Direct Democracy—Reforming the
Initiative Process: Bruce Cain,29 Christopher Elmendorf,30
Robert Stern,*31 and Gerald Uelmen.*32 Warren Olney33
moderated this panel.
In addition to our panelists and moderators, the Symposium
featured as keynote speakers former Governor Gray Davis34 and
Daniel Schnur.35 We owe a debt of gratitude to these keynote
21. Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, whose talk was
titled Proportional Representation in the Legislature.
22. Senior Fellow, School of Policy, Planning and Development, University of Southern
California and Political Analyst, KNBC.
23. Former Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California and Distinguished Emeritus
Professor, University of California Hastings College of the Law, whose talk was titled Popular
Sovereignty and Its Limits.
24. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, and
Visiting Associate Professor, Bill Lane Center for the West, Stanford University, whose talk was
titled The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform.
25. Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, whose talk was titled How to Conduct a
Constitutional Convention.
26. Hanson Bridgett LLP, Attorney for Repair California, whose talk was titled Getting to a
Constitutional Convention.
27. Executive Director, Los Angeles Charter Reform Commission and Professor, California
State University, Fullerton, whose talk was titled Constitutional Revision Commissions.
28. Los Angeles Correspondent for National Public Radio.
29. Director, Institute of Governmental Studies; Professor of Political Science, University of
California, Berkeley, whose talk was titled Fixing Ballot Box Budgeting.
30. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, whose talk was titled Why Sensible
Judicial Enforcement of the Amendment/Revision Distinction Requires a Constitutional Revision.
31. President, Center for Governmental Studies, whose talk was titled Improving the
Initiative Process.
32. Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, whose talk was titled
Enforcing the Single-Subject Rule for Initiatives.
33. Host & Executive Producer, Which Way, LA? and To the Point, KCRW.
34. Gray Davis was California‘s 37th Governor (1999–2003). Prior to that, he was Chief of
Staff to Governor Jerry Brown (1975–1981), California State Assemblyman (1983–1987),
California State Controller (1987–1995), and the 44th Lieutenant Governor of California (1995–
1999).
35. Chair, California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and Professor and
Director, Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics, University of Southern California. Prior to being
appointed to the FPPC, Schnur played an important role on the planning committee for the
Symposium.
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speakers, all of the panelists and moderators, and the many cosponsors of the Symposium: the California State Association of
Counties, the California Supreme Court Historical Society, the
Center for California Studies at Sacramento State University, the
Center for Governmental Studies, the Civil Justice Program at
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of
Politics at the University of Southern California, the League of
California Cities, and the United Way of California. Final thanks go
to Victor Gold, Dean of Loyola Law School Los Angeles, for his
indispensible support of this Symposium.
II. HOW WE GOT HERE
Californians ―have the right to alter or reform the [state
constitution], whenever the public good may require it.‖36 While as
Californians we have managed to alter our constitution over 500
times since adopting it in 1879,37 true reform has been elusive. The
distinction, and perhaps the problem, is reinforced by the constitution
itself, which permits ―amendment‖ by voter initiative but does not
permit voter-sponsored ―revision.‖38 While the distinction between
the meanings of ―amendment‖ and ―revision‖ is imprecise, the
California Supreme Court has stated that a revision is ―a fundamental
change in the basic governmental plan or framework established by
the Constitution.‖39 An amendment is a lesser change.40
36. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 2.
37. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783,
803 n.127 (2004). Dodson suggests that as aggressive as California is in altering its constitution,
it neither holds the record nor is unique in this respect. Id. For example, Alabama has amended its
constitution over 700 times, and Texas has amended its over 400 times. Id.
38. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (―The initiative is the power of the electors to
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.‖), with CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (―The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the
membership of each house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the
Constitution . . . .‖).
39. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 99 (Cal. 2009).
40. The California Supreme Court summarized its past holdings on the revision/amendment
distinction in Strauss, 207 P.3d at 88–98. While we do not intend this Introduction to analyze the
century-plus of case law on the difference between a revision and an amendment, it is fair to say
that the court held that a proposed change in the constitution could affect ―our basic plan of
government‖ through either the quantity or the quality of the changes. If, by either measure, the
proposed change sufficiently affected the ―basic plan,‖ then the proposal would be a revision and
the initiative would thus be unlawful. The holding in Legislature of California v. Eu, 816 P.2d
1309 (Cal. 1991), that ―it must necessarily or inevitably appear from the face of the challenged
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These labels—―revision‖ and ―amendment‖—have an enormous
potential substantive difference. The constitution may be ―amended‖
by (i) ―two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring‖41 or
by (ii) petition signatures of voters ―equal in number to . . .
8 percent . . . of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last
gubernatorial election,‖ followed by voter approval.42 However, the
constitution may only be ―revised‖ by two-thirds of the membership
of each house, followed by voter approval43 or by a constitutional
convention called in a like manner.44 In short, while the voters retain
the power to initiate amendments, one-third-plus-one of the members
of either house of the legislature can prevent any fundamental change
to the constitution.
In California, as elsewhere,45 super-majorities are exceedingly
difficult to achieve. Thus, we remain stuck in a state of seemingly
permanent impasse. To the extent that California‘s problems—

provision that the measure will substantially alter the basic governmental framework of our
Constitution‖ is also significant. Id. at 1319.
Unfortunately, these seemingly simple rules have been difficult to apply. For example, in
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990), the California Supreme Court struck down
Proposition 115 as being an impermissible revision because it restricted state courts from granting
criminal defendants rights in excess of those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1096. The
Court reasoned that Proposition 115‘s propensity to force state courts to follow federal courts‘
criminal-procedure precedents constituted a severe limitation on ―the independent force and effect
of the California Constitution‖—hence, a revision. Id. at 1088. On the other hand, the California
Supreme Court in Legislature of California v. Eu upheld Proposition 140—which imposed the
nation‘s strictest term limits (and, according to many scholars and other experts, fundamentally
changed the California Legislature)—as a permissible amendment because Proposition 140 fell
short of substantially changing the ―fundamental structure of the Legislature.‖ 816 P.2d at 1318.
Under Eu, the possible long-term consequences of Proposition 140 and its future effects on
California government were not relevant to the distinction between amendment and revision. See
id.
In light of even this highly abbreviated history, we conclude that it is difficult to predict
how the California Supreme Court would categorize various proposed reform initiatives (i.e., as
permissible amendments or as impermissible revisions).
41. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
42. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b); accord CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (―The electors may
amend the Constitution by initiative.‖).
43. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
44. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
45. For example, the Illinois Constitution requires that amendments initiated in the general
assembly be approved by three-fifths of each house and then approved again by the people. ILL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 2. Similarly, the Texas State Constitution requires that proposed amendments
be approved first by two-thirds of all members of both legislative houses and then subjected to a
vote by the people. TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 2.
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persistently late and gimmick-laden budgets, underfunded
elementary and secondary schools, colleges, universities, and the
like—arise from the structure of state government, then the supermajority required for any constitutional revision is a severe barrier.
Much of the criticism deservedly falls on government leaders for
their failure to address California‘s chronic problems. Nevertheless,
as the ultimate sovereigns in the state‘s political system, the people
themselves must bear principal blame. For example, a century ago,
they gave themselves the power of direct democracy—the rights of
initiative, referendum, and recall.46 Yet, in the intervening years they
have often exercised that political power in ways that have made
matters worse. Initiatives have hobbled the government‘s ability to
raise and spend money, to pass laws, to elect our representatives,
and, worst of all, to fix the very problems the people created. Ballot
measures that have gone awry, leading to unintended consequences,
are often hard to remedy. This is especially true of initiatives that
amend the state constitution, and there have been hundreds of them.47
What started out in 1879 as ―the third longest constitution in the
world‖48 grew nearly five-fold to over 95,000 words before it was
scaled back in 1974.49 Its length defies the admonition of Chief
Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,50 as it ―partake[s]
of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by
the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
46. ―The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the
Constitution and to adopt or reject them.‖ CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). ―The referendum is the
power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes‖ with certain exceptions.
CAL. CONST. ART. II, § 9(a). ―Recall is the power of the electors to remove an elective officer.‖
CAL. CONST. ART. II, § 13.
47. Symposium contributor Bruce Cain states that ―[f]rom 1879 to the mid-nineties,
California ranks first in the nation in proposed amendments (812) and second in adopted ones
(485), averaging 4.25 per year.‖ Bruce E. Cain, Constitutional Revision in California: The
Triumph of Amendment over Revision, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24,
2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html.
48. BRIAN JANISKEE & KEN MASUGI, DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 7 (2003).
49. PAT OOLEY, STATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS DEALING WITH STATE GOVERNANCE, CONSTITUTION REVISION
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (1996), available at www.californiacityfinance.com/
CCRChistory.pdf; California Constitution, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_
Constitution (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
50. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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public.‖51 Indeed, the California ―constitution‖ is not so much
constitutive as it is legislative.52 Each passing fancy and political
urgency, it seems, finds its way into our constitution.53 This is not a
new phenomenon. In 1930, the California Constitutional Revision
Commission reported that ―constant amendment‖ of the constitution
had ―produced an instrument bad in form, inconsistent in particulars,
loaded with unnecessary detail, encumbered with provisions of no
permanent value, and replete with matter which might more properly
be contained in the statute law of the state.‖54
The souring promise of direct democracy did not abate as our
experience with these political tools continued into the twenty-first
century. In a 2009 speech, California Chief Justice Ronald George
stated: ―Frequent amendments—coupled with the implicit threat of
more in the future—have rendered our state government
dysfunctional.‖55 Notable examples support the chief justice‘s
concerns and illustrate unanticipated problems with direct
democracy. Have the property-tax limitations of Proposition 1356
weakened local government and school districts, putting them at the
mercy of the state legislature? Have the term limits of Proposition
14057 deprived the legislature of expertise and encouraged short51. Id. at 407.
52. See Karl Manheim & Edward Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in
California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1165–74 (1998).
53. Many (perhaps most) initiatives seem ill suited for constitutional amendment. Without
intending to disparage these in particular, some recent examples of voter-approved constitutional
initiatives include Proposition 9, Victim‘s Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy‘s Law, available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i771_07-0100_a1ns.pdf (requiring victims‘
restitution), and Proposition 86, The Tobacco Tax Act of 2006, available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/proposition_86/entire_prop86.pdf
(increasing cigarette tax). Even statutory initiatives may have quasi-constitutional status. The
legislature ―may amend or repeal an initiative statute‖ only when ―the initiative statute permits
amendment or repeal without [voters‘] approval.‖ CAL. CONST, art. II, § 10(c). Thus, while
approximately two-thirds of proposed initiative statutes since 1970 have permitted amendment by
the legislature if consistent with the initiative‘s purpose, the proponents of a statutory initiative
have the option of insulating it entirely from the legislature. Robert M. Stern, The Future of
Direct Democracy, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting
California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at
www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal. 4th 1243 (1995).
54. OOLEY, supra note 49, at 6.
55. Joe Mathews, The California Fix: Making Amends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at A17.
56. This initiative has been embodied in the California Constitution, Article XIII(a).
57. The passage of Proposition 140 affected California‘s constitution in several sections. The
most notable are: CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(a) (limiting state Senators to two terms and state
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sighted behavior? Have the school-funding guarantees of Proposition
9858 tied the legislature‘s hands in dealing with budget shortfalls?
Our dysfunction is by now common knowledge and the focus of
worldwide attention.59 What is less understood, indeed seemingly
beyond reach—or, at least, beyond consensus—is how to fix
California. Many have offered solutions, some of which have real
promise. But it is not known whether these proposals would be
accepted by an impatient electorate or would actually work if
implemented.
One of the problems is the very tool that was devised to get
government out of the hands of powerful special interests and return
control to the people. Direct democracy, most notably including the
initiative process, was the fruit of the political reform movement of
the early twentieth century,60 an outgrowth of a populism and
discontent of that time that is not all that different from that seen
today in California and around the country. It is perhaps the ultimate
irony that initiatives are now more likely to be used by moneyed
special interests than by grassroots reformers.61 Indeed, grassroots
Assembly members to three terms); id. at art. V, § 2 (limiting any governor to two terms); id. at
art. V, § 11 (limiting the lieutenant governor, attorney general, controller, secretary of state, and
treasurer to two terms).
58. Proposition 98 impacted several sections of California‘s constitution. It added both
section 5.5 and section 8.5 to Article XIII(b); in addition, it amended Article XIII(b), sections 2
and 8. California Mandatory Education Spending, Proposition 98 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_98_%281988%29
(last
visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
59. E.g., Cal. Thomas Tribune Media Servs., Time to Take on California’s Bloated Budget,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Oct. 15, 2003, at 25A, available at http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2003/oct/15; Barrie McKenna, California on ‘Verge of System Failure,’ GLOBE AND
MAIL (last updated Dec. 21, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/economy/california-on-verge-of-system-failure/article1609891/; Jeff Segal & Dwight
Cass, Treat California Just Like G.M., N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at B2; Dan Walters, Outlook
for Effective Change in California Is Poor, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 2009, available at
http://www.scrippsnews.com/content/walters-outlook-effective-change-california-poor; .
60. In California, Hiram Johnson spearheaded the movement. Johnson was elected as
governor in 1910 and helped Theodore Roosevelt found the Progressive Party in 1912. History of
Initiative and Referendum in California, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/
History_of_Initiative_and_Referendum_in_California (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
61. Perhaps no better example of this evolution can be described than that which underlaid
the fate of the two proposed constitutional-convention initiatives described by attorney Steven
Miller in his talk before the Symposium. Steven Miller, Getting to a Constitutional Convention,
Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—
Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at
www.rebootca.org/media.html.
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groups typically find initiatives to be beyond their reach: most
initiatives require a minimum of $2 million to $3 million to pay
professionals to gather the signatures that qualify an initiative for the
ballot, not to mention the additional sums needed to campaign for
voter approval.62 This upending of direct democracy is likely to
accelerate now that the U.S. Supreme Court has given the green light
to corporations and other moneyed interests to spend at will on
elections.63
As the proliferation of special-interest initiatives continues,
often putting inconsistent demands on state-government structures,
people wonder why government has broken down. State and local
governments have fewer resources and fewer tools at their disposal
to solve the problems of an increasingly complex and diverse
society. But still we blame our leaders for the ensuing lack of
leadership. As of mid-2010, the California Legislature‘s approval
rating stood at a historic low—around 16 percent.64 At 22 percent,
62. In 2010, a statutory initiative required 433,971 signatures to qualify for the ballot, and a
constitutional initiative required 694,354 signatures to qualify. How to Qualify an Initiative:
Statewide Ballot Initiative Guide, CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballotmeasures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). California Signature
Requirements,
BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_signature_
requirements (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). Usually, potential compensation for invalid signatures
requires 20 or 30 percent more signatures. See id. Professional signature gatherers typically
charge four to five dollars per signature. Ben van der Meer, Tis the Season for SignatureGatherers, MODESTO BEE (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.modbee.com/2007/12/17/154626/tis-theseason-for-signature-gatherers.html (―The gatherers are paid for every legitimate signature they
get. The amount can vary, Arno said, from as little as 50 cents to up to $9 or $10 if organizers are
running into a deadline to qualify the initiative.‖); Paid Vs. Volunteer Petitioners, NAT‘L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16502 (last
updated June 17, 2010) (―Today, the vast majority of petition campaigns use paid circulators,
who are paid between $1 and $3 per signature.‖).
63. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 (2010) (extending the line of cases
starting with First Nat‘l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978), which held that corporations
could spend money to influence ballot measures). For a recent example of industry‘s use of the
initiative process to bypass or overturn the legislature, see Adam Nagourney, California Braces
for Showdown on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17pollute.html?pagewanted=print (―Charles and David
Koch, the billionaires from Kansas who have played a prominent role in financing the Tea Party
movement, donated $1 million to the campaign to suspend the Global Warming Solutions Act,
which was passed four years ago, and signaled that they were prepared to invest more in the
cause. With their contribution, proponents of the proposition have raised $8.2 million, with
$7.9 million coming from energy companies, most of them out of state.‖).
64. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., THE FIELD POLL 1
(2010), available at http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2346.pdf; see also Jim
Sanders, California Redistricting Commission Wants a Few Good Citizens, SACRAMENTO BEE,
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the governor‘s was not much better.65 And only 13 percent thought
the state was moving in the right direction.66 Californians are
unhappy but are unsure how to proceed.
Perhaps it will take a revamping of the entire state constitution,
or much of it, to restore a semblance of order to our government
structures. Traditionally, a constitutional convention is the body that
accomplishes wholesale revision of a constitution. It is there that ―the
people‖ come together in an act of ultimate sovereignty and assert
their original political power. If a convention is successful, frailties
and limitations imposed by existing structures are swept aside. We
may write on a ―clean slate,‖ more than metaphorically.
But we may have overly romantic notions of constitutional
conventions. The federal convention of 1789 produced a document
that has proven to be one of the most successful foundational
instruments of recent time. That convention operated illegally and
was shrouded in secrecy,67 but the intellectual giants and pragmatic
leaders who attended and debated in Philadelphia begat a
government that has endured and prospered through more than two
centuries of tumult and change.
California‘s own experience with constitutional conventions is
also the stuff of legend. Our first constitutional convention, in 1849,
occurred in the aftermath of the U.S. military‘s conquest of
California,68 during the gold rush, and with an eye to prospective
statehood‘s ramifications in Washington, D.C. It is not so much that
California‘s then-existing government was inadequate. Rather there
was no existing government,69 despite a series of six disinterested or
overwhelmed U.S. military governors beginning with the military

Dec. 16, 2009, at 1A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2009/12/15/2395982/californiaredistricting-commission.html (finding a 13 percent approval rating for the California
Legislature).
65. DICAMILLO & FIELD, supra note 64, at 1.
66. Id.
67. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 275–76 (2d ed. 2005).
68. Constitutional Convention History, CITY OF MONTEREY, http://www.monterey.org/
museum/conventhis.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
69. California‘s legal status was inchoate more than three years after the military conquest
and even after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. Early Monterey History, CITY OF
MONTEREY, http://www.monterey.org/museum/history.html#2 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).

Winter 2011]

INTRODUCTION

405

conquest in 1846.70 The convention chose statehood, and, in 1850,
Congress approved it.71
The delegates to the 1849 constitutional convention in Monterey
had the opportunity to invent the state‘s government.72 They used the
U.S. Constitution and other existing state constitutions as models, but
California was the ―Wild West‖ and it faced different conditions. So
the delegates innovated.73 For instance, California became officially
as well as de facto bilingual, with the new constitution published in
both English and Spanish.74 Perhaps presaging later attempts to
―legislate‖ via the constitution, the right of married women to own
separate property—an unusual right then in the United States—was
guaranteed.75
This first constitution lasted a scant thirty years. By 1878, it was
already apparent that Sacramento was unresponsive to emerging
needs. A second convention was called, and this produced the
constitution of 1879. This constitution incorporated important
changes: for example, it instituted ―home rule‖ for cities and
counties, increasing their power and autonomy. But our second
constitution also enshrined in the state‘s fundamental law provisions
that reflected and enforced the rampantly anti-Chinese political
climate of the 1870s and ‘80s. For this and other reasons, the 1879
constitution also lasted barely thirty years.76
The years 1909 to 1911 saw not a third convention, but the
emergence of constitutional reform at least as profound as the 1879
product. The initiative, the referendum, and the recall, which were
adopted in 1911, have permanently shaped our government in no
small way.77 Since then, California has resorted to less-sweeping
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CPS BRIEF 2
(Apr. 1991), available at http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/california_history.pdf.
74. Constitutional Convention History, supra note 68.
75. Id.
76. See generally CAL. STATE ARCHIVES, CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, INVENTORY OF THE
WORKING PAPERS OF THE 1878–1879 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1993), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/collections/1879/archive/1879-finding-aid.pdf
(providing
historical context and background to the 1878–1879 California Constitutional Convention).
77. California Proposition 7 (1911), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_
Proposition_7_(1911) (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).

406

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:393

changes to its governing document. The legislature has
commissioned three separate Constitutional Revision Commissions.78
The last disbanded in 1996.79 These commissions spurred some
important reforms, but they were fairly modest in scope.80 We have
not had a real constitutional convention for 130 years.81 As California
has changed drastically since the nineteenth century, we may need to
rethink the way we govern ourselves.
In 2009, two reform groups—perhaps despairing of nothing but
continued, inadequate reforms—began efforts to call a constitutional
convention. Under the current constitution, the legislature is the only
body that can place a call for a constitutional convention on the
ballot, just as it is the only body that can approve constitutional
revisions.82 Such a call requires a two-thirds vote in each legislative
house.83 Yet the legislature is unlikely ever to muster the two-thirds
majorities required.84 Indeed, the last time the people asked for a
convention, the legislature refused.85 (This intransigency is not
unique to California. Legislators elsewhere also see conventions as a
threat to their power. And where they do accede to popular demands
for a convention, they may seek the opportunity to control it.)86
Accordingly, these two reform groups sought to bypass the
legislature to call a convention. As the California Supreme Court

78. California Constitution, supra note 49.
79. California Constitutional Convention, BALLOTPEDIA, http://www.ballotpedia.org/wiki/
index.php/California_constitutional_convention (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (―The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal,
two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, may submit at a general election the
question whether to call a convention to revise the Constitution. If the majority vote yes on that
question, within 6 months the Legislature shall provide for the convention. Delegates to a
constitutional convention shall be voters elected from districts as nearly equal in population as
may be practicable.‖).
83. Id.
84. Karl Manheim et al., The California Quagmire, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/24/opinion/la-oew-manheim-20100524 (―However, the
Legislature is unlikely to achieve such a supermajority on whether the Pacific Ocean is salty, so
little chance exists that it would propose a convention or a new constitution.‖).
85. Editorial, The California Fix: Start from Scratch, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at A29.
86. The New York Times opposes a proposed constitutional convention for New York State
for this reason. See Editorial, The New York Convention Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A18.
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observed in Legislature of California v. Eu,87 ―the initiative process
may represent the only practical means of achieving the kind of
‗reforms‘ of the Legislature involved [t]here, because the revision
process can be initiated only with the consent of two-thirds
membership of each house of the Legislature.‖88
A group called California Action Network realized the dual
nature of the constitutional challenge ahead of it—to amend the
constitution to allow a call by initiative, and then to make the call—
and thus submitted two companion initiatives to the attorney general
in June 2009.89 This began the process of qualifying the initiatives for
the November 2010 ballot.90 The first initiative purported to ―amend‖
the constitution by allowing the voters to call a constitutional
convention by initiative. (In other words, the legislature would no
longer be the exclusive route to a convention.) If voters approved
that first initiative, the second measure would actually call a
convention.
The initiatives were cleared for signature gathering, but the
effort never got off the ground. Had it succeeded, the ensuing
convention procedure would have been unconventional, indeed,
quirky. The entire California Supreme Court would have been
sequestered along with the delegates to ―provide legal advice and
counsel to the Convention.‖91 Sequestration would be accomplished
by the California Highway Patrol92 to ―isolate [the delegates] from all
contact with any efforts by any special interest, political party, nonelected third persons, and any other outside influence from any
source, for the duration of the Constitutional Convention.‖93

87. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
88. Id. at 1316.
89. See Paul Talcott Currier, Proposed Constitutional Amendment Article 36: Electors Right
to Call for a Constitutional Convention, (June 23, 2009), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/
initiatives/pdfs/i815_initiative_09-0018.pdf; Paul Talcott Currier, Proposed Constitutional
Amendment Article 37: Electors Call a Constitutional Convention (June 23, 2009) (measure 090019), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i816_initiative_09-0019.pdf [hereinafter
Currier, Article 37].
90. Id.
91. Currier, Article 37, supra note 89, § 2(3).
92. Id. § 5(n).
93. Id. § 7(b).
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A second and more serious effort to call a convention was
undertaken in October 2009 by an initially well-funded group called
Repair California. It too submitted two companion initiatives to the
attorney general to begin the process of qualifying them for the
November 2010 ballot. As with the California Action Network
measures, Repair California‘s first initiative would ―amend‖ Article
XVIII of the state constitution to permit the calling of a ―Citizens‘
Constitutional Convention‖ by initiative.94 The companion initiative
would have actually called the convention had voters approved the
first initiative. ―Amend‖ is in quotation marks because a lawsuit
challenging the change to Article XVIII as an illegal ―revision‖ of
the constitution was inevitable. The lawsuit never materialized
because the Repair California effort stalled when the group
announced that it lacked the money to gather enough signatures to
qualify the proposed initiatives for the ballot.
Thus, well-intentioned and highly touted efforts to reboot
California by means of a constitutional convention never came about.
The demise came despite strong backing from the governor95 and
from the Los Angeles Times (―the Times‖), which devoted an entire
editorial series to it. In ―California Fix,‖ the Times argued that
California‘s constitution was so dysfunctional that it needed to ―start
from scratch.‖96
After years of ballot measures that undermined or eradicated one
another, Californians must recognize that our third convention is
already underway and has been in session for more than three
decades. It was called in 1978, when voters launched the propertytax revolt with Proposition 13. New resolutions come to the
imaginary floor of this virtual convention. Some come from the left,
creating programs and capturing funding, as with 2004‘s Proposition
63, which raised income taxes to fund mental health programs. Some
come from the right, limiting governmental power and discretion, as
with 1990‘s Proposition 140, which limited the time that state elected
94. See Jim Wunderman, Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Citizen‘s Constitutional
Convention Act (Oct. 28, 2009), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i863_
initiative_09-0066.pdf.
95. George Skelton, Schwarzenegger Is Getting His Second Wind as a Reformer, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/26/local/me-cap26.
96. See Editorial, supra note 85.
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officials could serve in office. But instead of being considered
together, these resolutions are adopted one by one, resulting in a
patchwork document with a self-negating message: government must
do more, and it must have less power and less money with which to
do it.97
Over the next several months, the Times continued with its
editorial theme that California faced ―so many problems, so many
competing interests [that] only rewriting the Constitution will do.‖98
Yet, after the collapse of Repair California‘s efforts, revising the
state constitution remains a distant vision. It may be that entrenched
interests simply will not let it happen. And without visionaries like
Hiram Johnson, our state could easily remain in limbo for the
indefinite future.
Of course, wholesale revision is not the only way to cure the
most pressing problems with our constitutional structure or
government institutions. We can continue with the piecemeal
approach and perhaps—with luck, perseverance, and the economy‘s
eventual recovery—achieve meaningful reforms. Although the call
for a convention did not appear on the 2010 ballot, a number of lessambitious yet important measures did. Among these were measures
prohibiting the state from seizing tax revenues dedicated to local
government99 and eliminating the legislature‘s super-majority
requirement to pass the state budget100 or to impose fees and taxes,101
as well as competing initiatives to repeal or extend the non-partisan
redistricting commission.102 Voters approved a June 2010 ballot
measure replacing partisan primary elections with a ―top-two‖
system. As with all of the recent amendments to the constitution, the

97. Id.
98. Editorial, The California Fix: Taming the Beast, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A29.
99. Proposition 22, which passed by a vote of 5,733,755 (60.7 percent) to 3,725,014
(39.3 percent). CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, 2010 GENERAL ELECTION: STATEMENT OF VOTE 7 (2011),
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf.
100. Proposition 25, which passed by a vote of 5,262,051 (55.1 percent) to 4,292,648 (44.9
percent). Id.
101. Proposition 26, which passed by a vote of 4,923,834 (52.5 percent) to 4,470,234 (47.5
percent). Id.
102. Propositions 20 (extend) and 27 (repeal), of which Proposition 20 passed by a vote of
5,743,069 (61.3 percent) to 3,636,892 (38.7 percent). Id.
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jury is still out, necessarily, on what these measures might
accomplish, especially in the long term.
III. THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES AND ESSAYS
The notion of ―rebooting‖ is derived from the computer
operation where a malfunctioning operating system is shut down and
restarted, clearing out any corrupted memory cells and software
glitches.103 Hopefully, rebooting California does not entail shutting
the system down, although parts of it seem headed in that direction.
Nonetheless, we may need to clear out malfunctioning components
to get our ―central processing unit‖ (state government) functioning
again at the level we need.
Continuing with computer metaphors, our state seems to be
―closed source‖: various structural ―locks‖ (e.g., legislative obstacles
such as super-majority requirements for budgets and constitutional
reform) impede our ability to adapt to challenges. This Symposium
was an effort to move to an ―open source‖ model in two senses—
first, by examining those locks and advocating the removal of those
that have become obsolete, and second, by seeking ideas from new
sources. Thus, we invited some of the best political and legal minds
to offer their solutions to particular problems in California
governance.
This part summarizes the diagnoses and prescriptions offered at
the Symposium, many of which are more fully developed in the
articles and essays that follow this Introduction. The major issues
have been divided into four categories: (1) budgetary and fiscal;
(2) electoral; (3) constitutional reform; and (4) direct democracy.
Each of these might justify a symposium in its own right. But they
are all related, and they all contribute to California‘s condition.
Whether piecemeal or comprehensive reform is preferred is itself an
issue discussed in the Symposium. All told, there are some excellent
ideas in the pages that follow. We believe that some, at least, will

103. Starting a computer is often referred to as ―booting‖ because older Disk Operating
Systems (DOS) used a ―boot‖ disk to initialize the operating system. The boot disk contained the
initial instructions that the computer needed to talk to its various parts, including the central
processing unit. Booting, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting (last visited Nov. 10,
2010).
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take hold and that California‘s operating system will get a muchneeded upgrade.
A. The Symposium Panels
Seventeen panelists and four moderators104 explored the critical
issues facing California.105 Participants presented articles in the
second, third, and fourth panels and offered provocative analyses in
all of them.
1. Fiscal and Budgetary Problems and Reforms
The day before the Symposium, Governor Schwarzenegger and
legislative leaders announced a ―framework agreement‖ on the
2010–2011 state budget. Details were not released until just before
the budget was approved on October 8, more than 100 days beyond
the constitutional deadline,106 making it the latest budget in California
history.107 The budget pleased no one. The Times called it ―[a]n ugly,
temporary answer to California‘s intractable budget problems.‖108
Once again, California faced unsolvable budgetary constraints.
Sacramento needed to close a $19 billion gap between revenue and
expenditures. The governor refused to entertain any tax increases, so
the legislature resorted to the only tools at its disposal—spending
cuts and budgetary gimmicks.109 The cuts were brutal, including
$3.5 billion in public education110 and $820 million in prison medical
facilities (despite a federal court order that the state improve prisoner
104. See supra notes 13–33.
105. Video of the panels can be found on the Symposium website: http://rebootca.org.
106. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (―The Legislature shall pass the budget bill by midnight on
June 15 of each year.‖).
107. Shane Goldmacher & Evan Halper, Lawmakers Sweat the Small Stuff; Budget OK
Comes Only After Hours of Parochial or Partisan Wrangling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A1.
108. Evan Halper, An Ugly, Temporary Answer to California’s Intractable Budget Problems,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010), http://latimes.com/news/local/la-me-late-budgets20101010,0,
2660478.story.
109. Sheila Kuehl referred to this as ―an all-cuts budget,‖ which the governor has proposed
for five of the last six years. Sheila Kuehl, Tax and Budget Issues, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html
110. Even since Proposition 13, school districts in California have relied on state revenues for
the bulk of their revenues, and they cannot easily make up shortfalls due to the requirement (also
in Proposition 13) that property-tax increases (the traditional source for school funding) be
approved by a two-thirds vote.
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medical care). Governor Schwarzenegger made an additional
$1 billion in line-item cuts when he signed the budget bill.111 The
gimmicks, which had been used before, included pushing some
expenditures into the next fiscal year and using unrealistic revenue
projections, such as projecting $2 billion more in federal revenue
sharing than the legislature actually expected from Washington.112
Creative accounting of this sort is one reason why California‘s
budget problems are endemic.
There is broad consensus that California‘s fiscal problems are
not transitory.113 They are deep-seated and structural. An obvious
example is Proposition 13‘s requirement that the legislature, by twothirds majorities in both houses,114 approve any tax increases. As Joe
Matthews and Mark Paul note, this feature gave the minority party
power to dictate tax policy without shouldering accountability to the
voters for its actions: ―The legislative majority felt the burden of
governing the state, but the minority could delay the most basic task
of the legislature—passing a budget—without being held
responsible.‖115 The minority often extracted concessions for favored
constituencies—California‘s version of pork-barrel politics—even
during times of budgetary crisis. With Proposition 13, ―[t]his form of
hostage-taking became the norm.‖116
For several years after Proposition 13 forever altered the state‘s
revenue system, the government of the world‘s eighth-largest
economy managed to limp along on accrued surpluses, the dot-com
boom, and other non-recurring events. However, booms turned to
111. Jack Dolan & Shane Goldmacher, Veto Ax Cuts into Social Programs, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2010, at AA.
112. The Times reported the following:
The most optimistic projections show that the spending plan Schwarzenegger signed
Friday will produce a shortfall of at least $10 billion—more than 11% of state
spending—in the next fiscal year. Many experts predict it will be billions more. The
leaders mostly papered over this year‘s gap, punting many tough decisions forward.
Halper, supra note 108.
113. See MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 7, 79–104; see also supra page 394.
114. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
115. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 47–48. Previously, a two-thirds vote from each
house of the legislature was needed to pass California‘s budget, but Proposition 25, which passed
on November 2, 2010, changed the two-thirds requirement to a simple majority. Proposition 13‘s
two-thirds requirement for tax increases was unaffected by Proposition 25.
116. Id. at 47.
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busts and the economic house came crashing down. The panelists on
the Symposium‘s first panel had different prescriptions for putting
our fiscal house back in order.
Jon Coupal—who carries the torch of the late Howard Jarvis,
author of Proposition 13—rejected that tax-cutting measure as the
source of the state‘s perpetual budget crisis.117 It is not the lack of
revenues that plagues the state, he claimed, but the expansion of
spending programs.118 It is the ―change in the perception of
government; less as an instrument to provide services for all, than
more as an instrument to pick winners and losers, or even worse to
redistribute wealth.‖119 Coupal thinks California would be better off
with a part-time legislature and more spending limits in order to rein
in unnecessary spending, such as spending on bloated welfare rolls.
Other panelists echoed Coupal‘s criticism of legislative
spending, although they did not necessarily agree with his analysis of
cause and effect. West Hollywood Mayor John Heilman presented
the perspective of California‘s municipalities.120 Heilman said that
one feature of Proposition 13 is that it removed revenue authority
from local governments, and it was reposed in Sacramento. As a
result of its fiscal dominance, the legislature often solves stategovernment budget problems on the backs of California cities,
counties, and school districts. Heilman complains that this ―raiding‖
of local-government revenues seriously undermines local
government‘s ability to provide public services.121 Heilman spoke in
favor of the November 2010 ballot‘s Proposition 22, which protects
local revenue sources from the legislature.122 He also criticized the
two-thirds-majority requirement for state budgets, claiming that it

117. Jon Coupal, Tax and Budget Limitations, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. John Heilman, Budgetary Impacts on California‘s Cities, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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generally lowers bond ratings and raises the cost of capital for
municipal borrowing.123
Sheila Kuehl, who served six years in the California Assembly
and eight years in the state senate, reinforced Heilman‘s criticism of
the budget process.124 She claimed that beyond the budget process,
the ideological polarization of the state (and the country) has led to
an impasse.125 Some, including then-Governor Schwarzenegger, want
to cut education or services to the poor, while others seek to close tax
loopholes for the wealthy and corporations. Kuehl gives property
taxes under Proposition 13 as an example: homeowners are taxed on
an average assessed valuation of $16 per square foot, while
Disneyland is taxed on a valuation of 5 cents per square foot. 126
Kuehl and several other panelists painted Proposition 13 as a leading
cause of the state‘s ills.127 Some of the panelists suggested a ―splitroll,‖ where property-tax limits would remain on residential property
but would be removed from commercial property.128
Kuehl also bemoans the deteriorating state of California public
schools. Discussing the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School
District, she said it is
one of the best funded in the state, [but] we have no fulltime janitors. The students do work-study to try to keep it
clean. We have no school libraries, really. . . . We have no
school nurses. . . . We laid off 16,000 teachers last year
because of the budget.129

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Kuehl, supra note 109.
Id.
Cf. CAL. TAX REFORM ASS‘N, SYSTEM FAILURE: CALIFORNIA‘S LOOPHOLE-RIDDEN
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TAX 83 (2010), available at http://www.caltaxreform.org/pdf_ppt/
SystemFailureFinalReportMay2010.pdf (stating that recent Disneyland property acquisitions are
taxed at a valuation of 37 cents per square foot).
127. Kuehl, supra note 109.
128. Id.
129. Id. In actuality, most sources report layoffs exceeding 26,000, not 16,000. See, e.g.,
News Release, Cal. Dep‘t of Educ., Schools Chief Jack O‘Connell Joins Educators in
Recognition of Record Number of Teachers Receiving Layoff Notices (Mar. 14, 2009), available
at http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr09/yr09rel40.asp.
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Kuehl‘s prescription ―to cure the dysfunction‖ includes eliminating
the two-thirds majority requirement for passing a budget ―and then
hold[ing] the majority responsible for the budget.‖130
Bob Hertzberg, former speaker of the assembly, agreed:
California‘s budget mess is why ―we can‘t make California work in
this globalized economy.‖131 At the recent World Economic Forum in
China, which he attended, California was seen as an embarrassment.
―The story that comes out is that we can‘t seem to get our
government together.‖132 Hertzberg also spoke of one of Proposition
13‘s ―unintended consequences,‖ which was to remove revenue
accountability from local government officials and centralize it (and
spending policy) in Sacramento.133
Hertzberg‘s view is widely shared.134 Now distanced from the
electoral scrutiny that accompanies responsibility for raising revenue,
local governments have pursued often highly irregular spending
priorities. For instance, according to Mathews and Paul, the median
wage in 2008 of Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District truck drivers
was $144,274, about three times the median wage in Sacramento
County.135 No one was looking, it seems, when fiscal accountability
was lifted off of local governments and sent to the state legislature.
Nor did anyone understand this transfer of power and loss of
accountability as one of the major reforms of Proposition 13.
From there, the fiscal picture and the shenanigans get even
worse. Lower bond ratings raise the cost of borrowing for
meritorious projects and create an uncertain business climate, just
when we can least afford it. Since the state cannot live off borrowed
money—except when it does—the legislature consistently sanitizes
truly scary budgets by resorting to gimmicks, such as delaying a
payday by a day, throwing it into the next fiscal year, or presuming
returns on investments that will never materialize. Or ―deeming‖ that

130. Id.
131. Robert Hertzberg, Bipartisan Fiscal Reforms, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 8, at 55.
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past revenues were at a level they actually were not at.136 ―Deeming‖
(rewriting) history is a technique that would have made Big Brother
proud.137
Perhaps we will soon start charging for public safety services,
just as we do for use of parks, education, health care, and other social
services. Or we can furlough university professors and pay them only
for the days they actually teach138 and not for non-teaching days
when they are idle (i.e., when they are preparing classes, doing
research, meeting with students, grading papers, contributing to
professional organizations, doing government and non-profit
consulting, recruiting, collaborating, giving interviews, performing
administrative tasks, etc.; all idle activities apparently). And
remember when those pesky parking tickets were $5? Fines, fees,
excises, charges, reimbursements, assessments, and other taxes
(except that the state cannot now call them taxes) fill holes in local
budgets that once were the province of property taxes. And watch out
for those red-light cameras. At $500 per ticket, one might think one
was single-handedly funding what is left of municipal government.139
California government is under attack from the right because of
the perception of high taxes; it is under attack from the left for failing
to provide what are perceived to be essential social services
136. For instance, in 1993, Senate Bill 1135 allocated $2.6 billion of local property-tax
revenues to newly created Educational Revenue Augmentation Funds within each county to
partially offset the legislature‘s Proposition 98 funding requirements. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§§ 97.02, 97.035 (West 2009). To further reduce the legislature‘s funding obligations, the
California Education Code provided that ―fund revenues appropriated for school districts and
community college districts, respectively, in fiscal year 1986–1987 . . . shall be deemed to be‖ a
different amount than was actually appropriated by the legislature seven years earlier. CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 41204.5 (West 2009) (emphasis added).
137. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (rewriting history constantly to
reflect current policies).
138. While many states, including California, have begun to furlough university professors,
Arizona State University seems to have perfected the scheme with its 8–12 percent salary
reduction. ―Faculty members will take furloughs on days they don‘t teach class, and supervisors
of staff members will be staggering furloughs so that the university remains fully operational.‖
Michael Crow, Message from President Michael Crow, ASU NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://asunews.asu.edu/20090128_furloughprogram (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
139. See All Things Considered: $500 for Running a Red Light? Blame the Camera, National
Public Radio (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
125990368. Traffic cameras are big-time money generators for municipalities, and it is no wonder
that ―to help solve California‘s $20 billion dollar crisis, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has
suggested retrofitting 500 city and county traffic cameras to generate even more money.‖ Id. The
fine for running a red light in Culver City can be $540. Id.
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(education, health care, elder care, and so forth). Likewise, both Wall
Street (which has downgraded both the state and local governments‘
bonds) and public-employee labor unions (which saw their members
furloughed and once faced the threat of Governor Schwarzenegger‘s
minimum-wage order) have declining confidence in the state‘s
government. Also, the trickle-down effects on local governments
have included broad employee furloughs, superior court staff layoffs,
school librarian layoffs, early releases of jailed inmates, closing of
public libraries, elimination of cultural and recreational programs,
and so on and on and on. Is anyone pleased with the state‘s
government or financial picture?
2. Electoral and Structural Reforms
The foundational idea of democracy is that government exists
with the consent of the governed. Yet in 2010, California‘s
government was so broadly unpopular that one may have wondered
about its legitimacy. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who
replaced former Governor Gray Davis after the latter‘s recall in
2003, has ratings as low or lower than those of the governor he
ousted.140 The legislature, in turn, is even less popular than the
governor.141 That the state‘s government is so unpopular with so
many major constituencies cannot be the mere result of enacting a
controversial statute or two. Such statutes might well draw criticism
from opponents, but they should draw support from proponents. In
California it is difficult to find any supporters of the current
government.
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to ask whether the
very structure of California government is at least partly responsible.
State fiscal problems may underlie many features of life in California
that its citizens find unsatisfactory. Underlying those fiscal problems,
however, are aspects of governmental structure (e.g., the relationship
between the state and subordinate governmental entities and the role
of initiatives and referenda in legislation) and political process (e.g.,

140. David Siders, Arnold Schwarzenegger Approval Drops to Record Low—Tied with Gray
Davis, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 30, 2010, 10:19AM), http://www.sacbee.com/2010/07/14/
2888500/arnold-schwarzenegger-approval.html.
141. Id.
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direct democracy again, term limits, voting methods, the role of
money) that must be addressed if we hope to accomplish reform.
Going beyond this general answer, that governmental structure
is at least in part to blame, involves substantial debate, as various
constituencies assess the likelihood that a particular restructuring
may or may not be of future benefit. We should not shy away from
such debates, as democracies are supposed to allow—indeed,
encourage—them. That is the focus of some of the articles in this
Symposium.
First, and most important, what type of government do we want
for the long term? By that, we do not mean to ask whether we want a
dictatorship or a democracy, or even whether we should have a
republican form of government as guaranteed by Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution. Just as within that guarantee, there is a wide range
of possible democratic structures.
a. Allan Ides—Proportional representation in the legislature142
Professor Ides explores the possibility of replacing our
bicameral legislature with a unicameral one based on mixed
membership, in the following sense.143 Such a body would be
selected in part using the single-member district, plurality-takes-all
system we currently have.144 But an equal part of the legislature
would be selected based on proportional representation, as practiced
in most other industrial democracies.145 He posits that such a system
would better reflect voter preferences and would release us from the
duopolistic (two-party) political system that has, recently at least,
failed to responsibly govern the state.146
Ides argues that our bicameral legislature (and that of every
other state but Nebraska) is a relic of the class-based division of
power in the British Parliament, where one house represented the
142. Allan Ides, Proportional Representation in the Legislature, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Allan Ides,
Approximating Democracy: A Proposal for Proportional Representation in the California
Legislature, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2011) [hereinafter Ides, Approximating Democracy].
143. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 441.
144. Id. at 455.
145. Id.; see id. at 440.
146. Id. at 441.
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aristocracy and royalty, a feature long gone (one hopes) from this
continent.147 It also emulates the structure of the U.S. Congress but
lacks basis in federalism for having two houses differently
composed.148 Given that the California Senate and Assembly are now
both selected in the same manner and represent similar
constituencies, a bicameral legislature serves only one purpose—to
impede the enactment of majority-supported legislation.149 It is antidemocratic in that it gives the party out of power two chances to
defeat popular legislation.150 This is especially apparent with the
super-majority requirements noted above for the adoption of budgets,
tax policy, and any meaningful reform measures. A bicameral
legislature may have been an innocuous feature of earlier, smaller
governments, but it has become an obstacle to effective governing in
modern times, especially given the extreme partisan battlefield that
American politics has become.151
Ides further argues that half of the legislature should be selected
through an ―open party list‖ system, where each party appearing on
the ballot is awarded seats in proportion to their respective shares of
the regional vote as long as they surpass a qualifying threshold (Ides
suggests 5 percent of the total vote).152 He argues that the advantages
of proportional representation are several: to break the duopoly‘s
hold, to promote minority and female representation, to better reflect
California‘s political pluralism, and to create the truly representative
democracy that we cherish.153

147. Id. at 455.
148. At one time, the senate and assembly emulated the U.S. Congress in that the two houses
represented different political communities. Assembly districts were based on population, while
senators represented counties. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), held that that structure
violated the 14th Amendment‘s equal protection clause. Id. at 568.
149. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 456.
150. See id.
151. See Harold Meyerson, A One-House Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A35
(―In the name of fostering transparency, ending gridlock, curtailing backroom deals and creating a
more responsive government, why doesn‘t California just abolish the Senate and create a larger
Assembly?‖).
152. Ides, Approximating Democracy, supra note 142, at 459–60.
153. Id. at 444, 462.
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b. Jessica Levinson—The constitutionality of open primaries154
Jessica Levinson questions the constitutionality of one of
California‘s latest ventures into constitutional change: Proposition
14.155 Passed in the June 2010 election, Proposition 14 creates open
primary elections in which only the top two vote-getters—regardless
of their party affiliations—proceed to the general election.156
Levinson explains the problems created by an open primary for thirdparty and independent candidates. However, before sounding the
death knell for these candidates in California, Levinson examines
whether Proposition 14 could survive scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme
Court.157
Here, she provides a comprehensive survey of the Court‘s
decisions surrounding the ballot access of minor parties and
independent candidates. While the case law is anything but clear,
Levinson projects that Proposition 14 would ultimately not survive
scrutiny under the Court‘s current test for determining the
constitutionality of ballot access restrictions.158 However, Levinson
does not rely on the Court to remedy the problems that Proposition
14 has created. Rather, she proposes legislative solutions: changing
the election code‘s qualification threshold and allowing write-in
votes.159

154. Jessica A. Levinson, The Constitutionality of Open Primaries, Address at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Jessica A.
Levinson, Is the Party Over? Examining the Constitutionality of Proposition 14 as It Relates to
Ballot Access for Minor Parties, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 463 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Is the
Party Over?].
155. Levinson, Is the Party Over?, supra note 154, at 467–68.
156. Id. at 467.
157. Id. at 507–13.
158. Id. at 511.
159. Id. at 513.
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c. Justin Levitt—The potential of citizen redistricting160
In his Symposium remarks, Professor Levitt explores the
experiment that is citizen redistricting. While Levitt is conscious of
the advantages implicit in entrusting the redistricting process to
incumbent legislators—such as political accountability, negotiation
skills, and expertise—he is equally mindful of the challenges that
such trust implicates.161 Here, Levitt uses examples to demonstrate
that giving legislators the redistricting responsibility poses the danger
that the public interest will be conflated with both personal and
partisan interests, somewhat like giving the fox the keys to the
henhouse.162 With this in mind, Levitt turns to the alternatives—from
hypothetical computer programs to Iowa‘s non-partisan legislative
staff agency model—focusing his exploration on California‘s
experiment with citizen redistricting.163 Two measures on the
November 2010 ballot implicated citizen redistricting. One measure
aimed to repeal the existing but not yet active citizen-redistricting
experiment, and the other sought to extend the citizen-redistricting
panel‘s powers to include not only the state legislature but also
Congress.164
While Levitt admits that citizen redistricting is no ―magic
bullet‖ for all of California‘s ills, he thinks that the redistricting
process—if entrusted to a group of people without any natural
conflicts of interest in the lines they are charged to draw—would be
a powerful tool. As Levitt explains, California‘s model involves
careful screening to ensure that the redistricting commission is
politically balanced and mirrors the diversity of the state.165 Though it
is not definite that citizen redistricting will actually happen, Levitt
notes that perhaps open minds are the most important tools for

160. Justin Levitt, The Potential of Citizen Redistricting, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html [hereinafter
Levitt, Address]; see Justin Levitt, The Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
513 (2011) [hereinafter Levitt, Potential].
161. Levitt, Potential, supra note 160, at 519–21.
162. Id. at 520–21.
163. Id. at 522–42.
164. Id. at 515.
165. Id. at 534–35.
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individuals on the commission to have.166 The commission must
move beyond preconceived notions of what good districts look like
because people do not live in ―little boxes and nice little circles.‖ 167
Rather, in order to draw districts that work to serve their
communities‘ needs, the commission must be prepared and trained to
perform technically tricky drawing. Entrusting a commission that
embodies all these qualities with citizen redistricting could, as Levitt
concludes, be a ―very promising experiment.‖168
d. Bruce McPherson—Get real, and reform169
Bruce McPherson states that California is already being
reformed in part. Proposition 11, passed in 2008, established a nonpartisan citizens‘ commission for drawing boundaries for state senate
and assembly districts.170 Also, Proposition 14, passed in 2010,
created top-two primaries for all congressional and state elections.
These two propositions may result in more moderate legislators and
executives being elected in California.
In terms of future reforms, McPherson recommends relaxing
term limits. In that regard, an initiative to that effect has already
qualified for the 2012 ballot. That measure would allow legislators to
serve in the state senate or assembly for up to twelve years total. He
also recommends reforming the initiative process. These reforms
might include banning paid signature gatherers, demanding
coordination between initiative proponents and the legislature, and
requiring initiatives that contain any spending mandates to identify
funding sources.
3. Mechanisms for Constitutional Reform
As we peel back the layers of causation of the state‘s problems,
we come to the 1879 constitution, which is still in effect, albeit
166. Levitt, Address, supra note 160.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Bruce McPherson, Get Real, and Reform, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html.
170. Proposition 20 in November 2010 expanded the non-partisan citizens‘ commission‘s role
to drawing boundaries for congressional districts. See CAL. SEC‘Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA
GENERAL ELECTION: VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 95–97 (2010).
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absent many of the racial provisions that, at least in part, motivated
the 1879 convention. It can be persuasively argued, and some among
our authors have done so, as has the Times, that the constitution is
the primary source of California‘s ills and that substantially
amending or revising it, or even replacing it entirely, is a necessary
predicate to real reform.171
a. Steven Miller—Getting to a citizens’ constitutional convention172
Symposium contributor Steven Miller was the principal drafter
of the Repair California initiatives.173 His article reviews the process
that led up to Repair California‘s convention effort and the problems
it faced had the call for a convention actually qualified for the ballot.
For instance, the first of Repair California‘s initiatives would have
―amended‖ article 18, section 2 of the California Constitution to
break the monopoly the legislature currently has over calling a
convention.174
Legislative control over the convention process is part of the
problem, not just in California but elsewhere.175 But fixing that
problem runs headlong into another—actually, the same—problem,
just stated differently. Bypassing the requirement that two-thirds of
the legislature must call a convention might itself require a
constitutional ―revision,‖ which can only be proposed by, you
guessed it, two-thirds of the legislature.
From Repair California‘s perspective, ―[i]t seemed clear that the
legislature would never act.‖176 The group‘s stance was demonstrated
by its end run to ―amend‖ the constitution by initiative, in the hope
that the California Supreme Court would permit the effort. Miller

171. Editorial, supra note 85; Editorial, supra note 98.
172. Steven Miller, Getting to a Constitutional Convention, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Miller,
supra note 12.
173. Supra note 26.
174. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
175. See, e.g., The New York Convention Con, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A18 (―The
Legislature has to start the process of calling this constitutional convention. Then, the political
establishment—mainly the Legislature—gets to pick most of the delegates. If it sounds like an
inside job, it is.‖).
176. Miller, supra note 12, at 549.
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explores the legal implications of the convention initiatives and
investigates whether the distinction between ―amendment‖ and
―revision‖ is an insurmountable barrier to citizen-initiated reform.
Miller‘s article is also designed as a practical guide for future
reformers ―with an eye toward improving on [Repair California‘s
initiatives] and trying in the future to chart a more successful path to
a constitutional convention.‖177
b. Thad Kousser—The blessings and curses of piecemeal reform178
Professor Kousser examines the three routes to creating
constitutional change in California: calling a constitutional
convention, crafting reform through the legislature, or placing
individual amendments on the ballot.179 While Kousser evaluates
each approach in informative detail, he focuses much of his analysis
on the last of these three paths—California‘s piecemeal approach to
constitutional change.180 Focusing on this third path is, of course,
appropriate since, as Kousser notes, it has become the ―mosttrafficked avenue to constitutional change.‖181
Here, Kousser details the blessings and the curses of the
piecemeal approach.182 One of the most important theoretical benefits
that the piecemeal approach provides is the opportunity for reformers
to make incremental change, adjusting their proposals after
observing the effects of their efforts.183 This approach, Kousser
implies, must be addressed to efforts at reform that are both
comprehensive and successful. Of course, as California well knows,
the piecemeal system is also cursed with troubles. Kousser details
these as well, and with these critiques in mind, proposes an
alternative fourth path to California constitutional change—a series
of bipartisan, single-subject ―logrolls‖—that Kousser contends will
177. Id. at 548.
178. Thad Kousser, The Blessings and Curses of Piecemeal Reform, Address at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Kousser,
supra note 9.
179. Kousser, supra note 9, at 573.
180. Id. at 573–74.
181. Id. at 583.
182. Id. at 573–74.
183. See id. at 584.
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balance the blessings and the curses of the piecemeal approach,
enabling effective reform.184
c. Ann Lousin—How to conduct a constitutional convention185
Drawing in part on her experience with the Illinois
Constitutional Convention in 1970,186 Professor Lousin outlines the
steps a state—such as California—should take to hold a successful
constitutional convention.187 Lousin guides reformers though her top
ten list of suggested factors that should be common to all modern and
successful constitutional conventions.188 Underpinning each factor
are the intertwined concepts of preparation and transparency that, for
Lousin, are the two undeniable keys to a successful convention.189
While Lousin‘s list is drawn from her experiences in Illinois,
and is customized for California, it is easily broadened for any sort of
political climate in the fifty states. This wide applicability likely
stems from the universality implicit in Lousin‘s two key concepts:
preparation and transparency. As Lousin notes, a successful
constitutional convention—no matter the particular political stage—
will take hard work, goodwill, and compromise, both to draft a sound
constitution and also to persuade voters to adopt it.190 Preparation and
transparency may sound like lofty goals, but, as Lousin concludes,
the constitution they can help to produce is worth the effort.191

184. Id. at 574.
185. Ann Lousin, How to Conduct a Constitutional Convention, Address at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Ann M.
Lousin, Essay: How to Hold a State Constitutional Convention in the Twenty-First Century, 44
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603 (2011) [hereinafter Lousin, Essay].
186. Lousin was a research assistant at the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, where she
worked on the drafting of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Lousin, Essay, supra note 185, at 603
n.*.
187. Id. at 604–05.
188. See id. at 606.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 621.
191. Id.
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d. Joseph Grodin—Popular sovereignty and its limits:
Lesson for a constitutional convention in California192
Professor Grodin examines the impediments to achieving
structural reform in California. While there are three paths to
changing the California Constitution, Grodin focuses on the
particular challenges presented by what might be the most elusive
avenue—the constitutional convention.193 Dismissing first the
popular-initiative process as unsuitable for true structural revision
and then the legislative initiative as unlikely to achieve the necessary
two-thirds majority of each house of the legislature, Grodin is left
with the third option—a constitutional convention—to achieve the
structural reform that California needs to get back on the right track.
However, even this remaining option presents its own challenges.194
Focusing specifically on the procedural issues likely to arise
from any convention proposal that departs from the format currently
prescribed by the California Constitution—that only the legislature
may propose a convention—Grodin models his comments after the
now-defunct propositions that Repair California advanced in 2010.
With an eye toward future reform, Grodin confronts two challenges:
(1) whether the initiative process could be used to modify the
California Constitution to allow a constitutional convention to be
called through the initiative process without any legislative action;
and (2) whether an initiative could also provide for the selection of
convention delegates by a method different from that currently
specified by the constitution.195 Exploring the relevant California
constitutional provisions and cases, Grodin eventually answers both
in the affirmative.196 While, as Grodin notes at the outset, the recent
call for a constitutional convention did not qualify for the ballot, his
insights remain highly relevant as California considers all its avenues
to constitutional reform.
192. Joseph Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits, Address at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html; see Joseph R.
Grodin, Popular Sovereignty and Its Limits: Lessons for a Constitutional Convention in
California, 44 LOY. LA. L. REV. 623 (2011) [hereinafter Grodin, Lessons].
193. Grodin, Lessons, supra note 192, at 625–26.
194. Id. at 625.
195. Id. at 626, 633.
196. Id. at 632–33.

Winter 2011]

INTRODUCTION

427

e. Raphael Sonenshein—Constitutional revision commissions197
Professor Raphael Sonenshein explores an often-forgotten
model of governmental reform—the citizens‘ commission. While
Sonenshein acknowledges that the alternative models, such as the
constitutional convention, generate more excitement than the
citizens‘ commission, inherent in this excitement is a risk of radical
change that those currently in power find threatening.198 This risk
provides powerful incentive for certain groups to seek control over or
to interfere with the convention before any reform can even be
accomplished. But while a constitutional convention has failed to
materialize in California, reformers should not lose hope. Rather,
they should, as Sonenshein suggests, explore alternatives.199
In seeking out an alternative reform model, Sonenshein directs
reformers to look up to the federal government, across to other state
governments, and down to local governments.200 Surveying reform
efforts at each of these levels, Sonenshein focuses on the citizens‘
commission‘s rich history in American cities.201 Sonenshein contends
that adopting a citizens‘ commission model of reform would reduce
the initial ―cost‖ of undertaking reform, while offering voters and
elites the possibility of well-designed reforms to gain their
confidence.202 As evidence, Sonenshein explores the constitutional
revision commissions in Florida and Utah as viable models for
California to follow.203 In explaining these models‘ utility,
Sonenshein suggests slight alterations customized for California‘s
unique political climate.204 Of course, there are difficulties with the
citizens‘ commission model—which are openly acknowledged—that

197. Raphael Sonenshein, Constitutional Revision Commissions, Address at the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Raphael
Sonenshein, Can a Citizens’ Commission Help Repair California Government? Lessons from
Local Charter Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 637 (2011) [hereinafter Sonenshein, Citizens’
Commission].
198. Sonenshein, Citizens’ Commission, supra note 197, at 639–41.
199. See id. at 643–44.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 649.
202. Id. at 652.
203. Id. at 654.
204. See id. at 655.
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would require careful consideration to overcome. But as Sonenshein
notes, California reform would be well worth the effort.205
4. The Future of Direct Democracy
In contrast to those scholars who feel that the constitution is
California‘s primary problem, and its amendment the essential
solution, are those who take a more focused view. They contend that
the institution early in the twentieth century of the initiative, the
referendum, and the recall has been perverted by subsequent
developments, particularly the rise to a dominant position of money‘s
influence on the initiative process. The pieces in this part of the
Symposium present aspects of this debate and provide important
guidance for future actors in this field, both academic and
governmental.
a. Gerald Uelmen—Enforcing the
Single-Subject Rule for Initiatives206
Professor Uelmen examines and laments the California Supreme
Court‘s failure to exercise meaningful control over California‘s
―fourth branch of government‖—the initiative process.207 For
Uelmen, the court‘s failure comes as a great disappointment,
especially after he hailed the court‘s removal of the Let the Voters
Decide Act of 2000 from the ballot in Senate v. Jones208 as a sign that
the single-subject rule had grown teeth and could be used as an
effective means of pre-election review. Uelmen reviews California
Supreme Court decisions since Jones that examine initiatives for
compliance with either the single-subject rule or the prohibition of
constitutional revision. He argues that both doctrines ―have again
been reduced to historical artifacts‖ and that pre-election review of
initiatives has been greatly limited.209
205. See id. at 658.
206. Gerald Uelmen, Enforcing the Single-Subject Rule for Initiatives, Address at the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and
Government Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Gerald F.
Uelmen, Review of Initiatives by the California Supreme Court, 2000–2010, 44 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 659 (2011) [hereinafter Uelmen, Review].
207. Uelmen, Review, supra note 206, at 660–61.
208. 988 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999).
209. Uelmen, Review, supra note 206, at 661.
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At the end of his chronology, Uelmen concludes that Jones was
a mere ―hiccup‖ and that the court‘s subsequent decisions
minimizing the ability of the single-subject rule and the prohibition
against constitutional revision to work as effective tools of preelection review of initiatives have strangled California‘s ability to
reconsider and improve its political ideas.210 Instead, the state is left
without any ―ability to regulate and fine-tune the application of any
changes.‖211 Where the court has failed to enforce constitutional
limits on the currently ―unbridled power of the initiative in twentyfirst century California,‖212 the state is left to amend its amendments,
as that is the only effective means of evolving its political ideas.
b. Robert M. Stern—Improving the initiative process213
Robert Stern suggests that rather than continue down the path of
direct democracy, California should return to voluntary indirect
democracy.214 Under that system, the legislature reviews an initiative
before it appears on the ballot; if the legislature votes to pass the
proposal, then the initiative is adopted without appearing before the
voters.215 Stern examines the history of voluntary indirect democracy
in California, arguing that its infrequent use reflects not that it failed
as a process but that it was the result of a now-defunct constitutional
provision.216 Although California repealed indirect democracy in
1966, Stern shows that indirect democracy is viable by examining its
various forms and uses in ten of the twenty-four states that employ
the initiative process.217
Stern issues a rallying cry, designating 2012 as the election year
to propose an initiative amending the initiative process itself.
210. Id. at 661.
211. Id. at 670.
212. Id. at 669.
213. Robert M. Stern, Improving the Initiative Process, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government
Reform (Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html; see Robert M. Stern,
California Should Return to the Indirect Initiative, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671 (2011) [hereinafter
Stern, California Should Return].
214. Stern, California Should Return, supra note 213, at 673.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 674–75.
217. Id. at 676–79.
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Suggesting a mandatory version of indirect democracy different from
its predecessor, Stern argues that indirect democracy will lessen two
problems produced by direct democracy—that voters are
overwhelmed by both too many ballot measures and poorly drafted
measures.218 Citing his forty years of experience as a faithful observer
of the legislature, Stern estimates that indirect democracy would
reduce the number of ballot measures in each election by one or two
initiatives.219 While Stern acknowledges that some Californians may
be reluctant to return additional responsibility to the legislature,
indirect democracy will produce better-drafted initiatives since
circulation to the legislature will increase the likelihood that errors
will be caught and remedied so that the text better reflects the
proponents‘ intent.220
c. Bruce Cain—Fixing ballot box budgeting221
Bruce Cain says that it would be important to change the
initiative process, but adds that nothing will be changed. He also
explains that courts are no longer a substantial check on the process.
Specific California Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the court‘s
reluctance to enforce strictly the single-subject requirement and its
reluctance to strike down constitutional initiatives as being revisions
instead of amendments. Cain also explains that not all of California‘s
current problems may be blamed on initiatives. For example, the
budget problems—including the pension underfunding—are not
unique to California. state budgeting is always difficult, he says,
because most states do not permit deficit budgeting. There are,
however, problems specific to California that come as a result of the
initiative process, which he calls ―ballot box budgeting.‖222 Cain
noted that these are not necessarily partisan, or liberal versus
conservative, features of the process.223 For example, budgeting

218. Id. at 679 & nn. 61–62.
219. Id. at 681.
220. Id. at 681–83.
221. Bruce Cain, Fixing Ballot Box Budgeting, Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform
(Sept. 24, 2010), available at www.rebootca.org/ media.html.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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mistakes are usually made during good economic times, but the
consequences do not appear until economic downturns. Part of the
reason that voters do not trust legislatures, and thus turn to
initiatives, is that legislatures are often placed in the untenable
position of having to fix problems created by prior initiatives.
The most important problem in this area is what Cain labels
―fiscal federalism,‖ meaning that the state government, for the most
part, collects the taxes, while local entities make the spending
decisions.224 This creates incentives that are ―out of line.‖225 As with
other aspects of the initiative process, Cain remains pessimistic as to
the likelihood of reform, primarily because powerful special interests
are well served by keeping the system as it is.
In the question period, Cain pointed out another anomaly in
California‘s budgetary system: ordinary policy changes often require
a supermajority, while basic structural changes—such as those often
carried out through initiative constitutional amendments—pass with
a simple majority.226 This is a complete reversal of the standard
theory of democratic government.
d. Christopher Elmendorf—Why sensible judicial enforcement of the
amendment/revision distinction requires a constitutional revision227
Professor Christopher Elmendorf discussed the California
Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence regarding challenges to initiative
changes to the constitution based on the distinction between
―amendments‖ and ―revisions.‖ to the constitution. The basic tenet is
that a ―revision‖ is a change that works a ―revisional effect‖ on our
―basic plan of government.‖228 According to Elmendorf, the court has
stated that this distinction is fundamental to the very idea of the
constitution as an ―instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,‖229
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This is why the revision procedure is ―high-cost, difficult, and timeconsuming.‖230
However, the court‘s actual doctrinal test for a ―revision‖ does
not track this idea. The court‘s test asks whether, as to the challenged
change in the constitution, its ―revisionary purpose‖ is revealed on its
face at the time of the challenge, or whether it has been demonstrated
that the change will ―necessarily or inevitably produce a revisionary
effect.‖231 This test has led the court to reject challenges to many
nominal-appearing changes that have had a substantial revisionary
effect on the plan of government.
Elmendorf suggested three principal reasons for the court‘s
reluctance to invalidate initiative-based changes to the constitution:
the court‘s reluctance to decide so-called political questions; its
disinclination to overturn the will of the people; and its concern that
rejection of the change will simply send the issue back into a
―legislative stranglehold.‖232
Finally, Elmendorf proposed a solution to the problem of the
court‘s reluctance: a legislative constitutional amendment (to be
ratified by the voters) that would (1) declare the ―basic principles of
the Constitution‖ as a guide to the court in ruling on initiative
challenges; (2) instruct the court to resolve such challenges on the
basis of empirical evidence as to how the change would work;
(3) create periodic constitutional-review commissions to propose
changes to the constitution; and (4) provide for the automatic
placement of a constitutional-convention initiative on the ballot
every twenty years.233 In the question period, Elmendorf explained
why he thought that the legislature might act to put such an
amendment on the ballot: because of its strong interest in getting the
court to overturn term limits.234
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e. John S. Caragozian—From crisis to solution—
California’s problems in two books: A review of
Remaking California and California Crackup235
A Symposium organizer, and a co-author of this Introduction,
John Caragozian reviews two timely books that deal with this
Symposium‘s theme—California‘s problems and solutions.236 The
first, Remaking California, edited by R. Jeffrey Lustig, categorizes
events such as Proposition 13, the three-strikes law, and Proposition
140 into three structural problems: (1) the governance crisis, (2) the
representation crisis, and (3) the social order crisis.237 Several
experts, including Symposium moderator Dan Walters of the
Sacramento Bee, explore these crises.238 The second book, California
Crackup, by Joe Mathews and Mark Paul, also lists California
problems, noting that the worst problem of all is that under
California‘s current governmental system, none of the other
problems can be fixed.239
Both books t to place California on the road to reform by
suggesting a variety of solutions that parallel the Symposium‘s
themes. For example, Mathews and Paul propose mandating that
initiatives be drafted by professional governmental staff so as to
avoid incomprehensible, self-contradictory, or otherwise improper
language.240 This concern with poorly drafted initiatives reminds us
of Stern‘s hope that the legislative review of initiatives implicit in a
switch back to indirect democracy would increase the likelihood that
errors in initiative drafts would be remedied in order to better reflect
the proponents‘ intent. While Mathews and Paul propose a different
means, they share an end similar to that of Stern‘s. This is just one of
the commonalities the Symposium shares with both California
Crackup and Remaking California, and as California considers all of
its routes to reform, the combination serves as an important and
informative review of today‘s proposals.
235. John S. Caragozian, From Crisis to Solution—California’s Problems in Two Books: A
Review of Remaking California and California Crackup, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 687 (2011).
236. Id. at 687.
237. Id. at 687–88.
238. See id. at 688–89.
239. Id. at 697.
240. Id. at 702.
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B. Keynote Addresses
1. Governor Gray Davis241
Former Governor Gray Davis provided the Symposium‘s
keynote address at the event‘s luncheon.
The theme of the governor‘s remarks was his prescription for
what is needed to repair California‘s problems to ―get Sacramento
back on track.‖242 The problem, he said, is that legislators‘ interests
are not aligned with the public interest. Both political parties have
conflicting but legitimate points of view, to which their legislators
strictly adhere. Nothing positive will happen, however, until
legislators in both parties are willing to challenge their respective
party‘s orthodoxy.
Two recently passed laws provide some hope that this will
happen in the future. One of these is an initiative that removes
control of redistricting from the legislature and turns it over to a
citizen panel. The other is the open-primary reform, which passed in
June 2010. This reform should provide more centrist legislators by
giving the general voter ―two cracks‖ at voting for legislators in each
election cycle. A previous similar reform was struck down by the
U.S. Supreme Court, but that decision was, in the governor‘s
opinion, based on a misunderstanding of California politics.
Because of these two reforms, at least 20 percent of the
legislators should be willing to tackle the big problems that the
current legislature will not deal with. If those 20 percent do not, they
will lose their seats in the 2012 election.
To these two reforms, the governor would add two others: a
―rainy day fund‖ included in each budget and a mandatory spending
cap. The rainy-day fund would smooth out the effect of the business
cycle on the state‘s revenues. The state will be forced to show the
same restraint in its spending that citizens do in their family budgets.
The governor then listed four additional reforms that he feels
would help to alleviate the problems caused by chronically late state
budgets. The first two would permanently dock the pay of legislators
241. Supra note 34.
242. Gov. Gray Davis, Keynote Luncheon Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions, and Government Reform (Sept. 24,
2010), available at www.rebootca.org/media.html.
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and the governor for every day after July 1 of each year that the
budget is late and would forbid political fundraising as long as the
budget is late. The third would limit legislative sessions to four
months out of each year, providing less time in Sacramento for
legislators to pass unnecessary laws and more time out of
Sacramento for constituent service. Finally, the governor advocated a
basic reform of the initiative process that would deny a place on the
ballot to any initiative that did not specify a funding source for its
proposal.
Expanding on the initiative issue, the governor cautioned that
Proposition 27, a provision on the November 2010 ballot, would be a
―poison pill‖ that could repeal the redistricting initiative that he had
lauded at the beginning of his remarks.243
Governor Davis completed his remarks by reminding the group
that California still has a positive influence because it ―provides
innovation to the world.‖244
2. Dan Schnur245
Dan Schnur, the Symposium‘s tribute-dinner keynote speaker,
opened with an optimistic message to participants and sponsors: ―As
dire a picture as today‘s panelists have painted, there is hope for the
state of California and its processes of government and politics
simply because there are at least small groups of people who care
enough to think about it, to talk about, and to worry about‖ fixing
California.246
Schnur‘s second and related point was that ―politics is way too
important to leave to the politicians.‖247 A politician‘s goal, ―first,
foremost, and always, is to get re-elected,‖ not to bring necessary
reforms.248 That job is for the people of California. While all the
proposed or recently enacted structural reforms are important, they
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are not ends unto themselves but means to allow substantive change.
That requires not merely the reform movement, of which Schnur is a
proud member, but the active involvement of people who do not
otherwise live, eat, and breathe politics. ―California will overcome its
sea of intractable public policy challenges, but not because of a
constitutional convention or even initiative reform, but because we
convince ordinary people there is a place for them in the political
process.‖249
How does this come about? How can regular citizens be
motivated to take up Steve Jobs‘s challenge to ―make a dent in the
universe‖?250 One way ―is to make it as easy as possible for average
citizens to participate in the process, rather than make it harder.‖251
Schnur asserts that that is his principal goal as Chair of the California
Fair Political Practices Commission. ―The political process belongs
to the people, not to the politicians.‖252
IV. CONCLUSION
We offer this Symposium issue of the Law Review to its readers,
as was the live Symposium to its attendees, in the spirit of open
inquiry, open expression, and open debate that the organizers feel
must precede any meaningful reform that can provide relief for
California‘s manifold problems.
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